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SOME TRUSTEES ARE AMATEURS
By JOHN SHERMAN MYERS*
"The real Trustee .

..

some farmer, it may be,

who from a sense of cronyship has consented to act as
a Trustee under the will of a neighbor with whom on
market days he has often had a friendly glass. There
he stands, ignorant for certain, pigheaded very likely,
quarrelsome possibly, but honest, palpably honest and
perspiring. le is charged with losses occasioned by
his d.:sregard of the strict language of a will he never
understood. . .
It may be necessary to ruin such a
man, to sell his harses and his cows, his gig and his
carts, and to drive him from his old home, but it cannot be done without a qualm." BIRRELL.**
There are many individuals w ho have undertaken to act
in a fiduciary capacity, as trustee, executor, guardian or
otherwise, without full realization that the obligations imposed upon them by law may result in substantial personal
liability, even though every act has been in complete good
faith and in an honest effort to perform, conscientiously and
efficiently, the duties undertaken.'
*Professor of

Law, Washington College of Law, The American
University, Washington, D. C.
**TIIE DUTIES AND LIABILITIE3 OF TRUSTEES 16 (1896), quoted by
1.

Scott, Fifty Years of Trusts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 60, 64 (1936).
If the fiduciar'y does not live up to an external standard-the skill
and prudence of an ordinary man engaged in administering his
own affairs with like objectives-his good faith, his honest intent,
and his sincere purposes will not save him from liability. St. Paul
Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 88 N.W. 256 (1901) ; Moeller v.
Poland, 80 Ohio St. 418, 89 N.E. 100 (1909). See GA. CODE § 108402 (1933) ; Code of Fair Competition for Bankers, Art. III, § 3,
approved by the Executive Council of the American Bankers Association, April 11, 1933, reprinted in BOGERT, CASES ON TRUSTS
858, 860 (1939).

Obviously, the utilization of an external standard to determine
the quality of an act will often result in demanding that the actor
live up to requirements that are in excess of his individual capacities. This is axiomatic. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C.
(159)
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Corporate and other professional fiduciaries are aware of
these obligations and the extraordinary potential liabilities
imposed. This is natural, since fiduciary activities constitute
their business, and the acceptance of the possible liabilities
is a calculated business risk measured against the profit expected to be derived. For the amateur fiduciary, however,
the imposition of liability for the result of an act done in
good faith must often come as a rude awakening, and it is
to a consideration of possible relief for these individuals
that this paper is dedicated, bearing in mind that many of
them are "just people" who have assumed their duties2 not
for the fee involved, but because of an emotional desire to
do the right thing for a friend who has passed on? One of
the most important problems to which special consideration
could be given is in the matter of delegation.
The complexities of modern business have resulted in an
ever expanding trend toward specialization. On every side,
468 (1837), and Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188 Atl. 181
(1936) (negligence cases) ; Knox v. MacKinnon, 13 App. Cas. 753,
766 (1888) (trustees).
2. It is sometimes said that because a trustee need not accept a trust,
Carruth v. Carruth, 148 Mass. 431, 19 N.E. 369 (1889), he can
avoid liabilities by refusing, and that if he accepts he must take
the obligations with the benefits. But the individual with whom we
are here concerned in fact does not know of the obligations and,
therefore, has no actual choice-and we should accept the reality;
he does not have to give the matter a thought.
3. If the reader believes that a result of giving special consideration
to the plight of the amateur is to advocate a higher standard for
corporate and other professional fiduciaries, let him make the
most of it! There is indication that this is so. See In re Clark's
Will, 136 Misc. 881, 242 N.Y. Supp. 210 (1930), rev'd, 257 N.Y.
132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931) ; In re Westfield Trust Co., 115 N.J. Eq.
611, 172 Atl. 212 (1934); In re Allis' Estate, 191 Wis. 23, 209
N.W. 945, 210 N.W. 418 (1926) ; and see Scott, Fifty Years of
Trusts, 50 HARV. L. REV., 60, 65 (1936). See further: Note, 30
COL. L. REV. 1166, 1171 (1930); Note, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 125
(1930). But see: In re Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 38, 148 Atl.
912, 914 (1930).
Certainly the professional who represents that he has unusual
abilities (of course, greater than those possessed by the ordinary
man) should be required to live up to them if appointed in reliance on those representations. See 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES 360 (1946).
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experts are available to handle many of the technical problems of more or less regular occurrence in the daily activities
of the business man. These include, of course, the lawyers,
the engineers, and the efficiency experts. There are, too, the
apparisers, the stock brokers, the commodity brokers, and
hosts of others, all available to the harassed business man
at the bother of a telephone call and the expense of a reasonable fee. Business men, in the conduct of their own affairs,
are privileged to employ these experts at will, and, if they
so desire, completely to turn over to them vexing problems,
confident in the knowledge that, assuming careful and
proper selection of the specialist, the work will be well and
ably done with results superior to those achieved had the
delegation not been made.
Fiduciaries, on the other hand, do not have as much freedom. They, it is said broadly, must themselves perform the
duties they have undertaken and while they may delegate to
others those activities of a purely ministerial nature, any
delegation of powers which requires discretion4 will result
in the fiduciary becoming what is, in effect, a guarantor of
the results. This is the anomoly: A fiduciary completely ignorant in a given field (say of investments) may not turn
over to a specialist in that field the complete discretion unless
he is willing to accept the risk of a personal liability far
greater than if he had done the work himself, using due care,
with no matter what unfortunate results.
The rigid and sometimes unrealistically high standards
imposed on fiduciaries are readily accounted for by the historical background of the applicable rules. The wronged
beneficiary had no relief at common law 5 -uses and trusts,
if recognized at all, were regarded as obligations based on
nothing but honor, and were given no legal standing what4. The distinction between the delegation of "ministerial" and "discretionary" duties is not completely accurate. 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 171.2 (1939). But it is accurate enough for present purposes.
5. The early common law, it will be remembered, afforded no remedy
except through the use, by the plaintiff, of a writ, technically
correct in form, which exactly fitted the particular case. Spence,
The History of the Court of Chancery in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 219, 236 (1908).
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ever-even though the trustee had violated the trust provisions in the most flagrant manner.' The custom, in the
absence of adequate legal remedy, of petitioning the king
through his chancellor and later through the court of chancery,7 resulted in aggrieved cestuis and other beneficiaries
of a fiduciary relation seeking relief in this manner, and it
was not long before such requests for redress were recognized,8 as was proper in a tribunal where strict form and
legal technicality were disregarded and equity and fairness
were the bases of the chancellor's consideration of the cause.
It is natural, therefore, in all equity cases, including those
dealing with the acts of a fiduciary, emanating from a font
of such propriety as the conscience of the king, to find great
emphasis placed on appropriately high-minded standards,
at least to the extent of giving them lip service. We are
thus able to account for the existence of many of the basic
principles of equity which, over hundreds of years and
through thousands of cases, have found their way into our
present legal system. Too often these principles are relied
upon as controlling precedents, rather than being recognized
as convenient bon oots, in the form of maxims,' used by the
6. As, of instance, the bland denial of the existence of the trust, and
the appropriation of the trust res by the trustee for his own
benefit. Ames, Lectures on Legal History 236 (1913). A few of
the simplest cases were recognized in the law courts, constituting
the so-called "common law trusts." For example, detinue was
available to obtain a chattel handed to one person for delivery
to another, Ames, Origin of Uses and Trusts in 2 SELECT ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 737, 743 (1908); and an
action of account could be used where money was given by one
person for payment to another. Anonymous, Y.B. 6 Henry IV, f.
7, pl. 33 (1405), cited in AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS 1 (2d Ed.
1893).
7. MAITLAND, EQUITY 1-11 (2d Ed. 1936). See also Maloney, Injunctive Law Enforcement, 1 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1949), for a brief description.
8. Ames, Origin of Uses and Trusts, op. cit. supra note 6, at 741,
742.
9. Pomeroy indicated that one who fully comprehends the meanings
attached to maxims by courts of equity has an insight into the
essentials of equity jurisprudence. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (5th Ed. 1941). But if one has such a comprehension,
one no longer needs the maxims except as memory refreshers.
Blackstone once listed sixty-five maxims-Pomeroy only eleven.
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early chancellors to give, if you will, publicity to the high
standards of conduct necessarily to be followed if the royal
conscience was to be salved.
Among the early principles applied by equity to the conduct of fiduciaries, particularly trustees, was the emphatic
"delegatus non potest delegare"'°-thesettlor having named
a trustee to perform a trust was entitled to the personal
services of that trustee and not those of some delegatee.
However this may be, it must be remembered that except for
those comparatively rare cases where the duties are so personal to the named trustee that he and only he can carry
them out," the courts will always supply a trustee when the
settlor has failed to do so12 and if a person named refuses
to serve or otherwise fails to qualify, the courts designate a
substitute 3 and have done so without experiencing difficulty
from the often suggested idea that the settlor wanted the
See

10.

11.

12.

13.

McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY

54 (2d

Ed. 1948).
Literally, "a delegate cannot delegate." It is doubtful if this
should be afforded the dignity of a "maxim"-it was probably
nothing more than a descriptive statement of the thought processes of the early chancellors. The point is of no importance.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Powers, 268 Ky. 491, 105 S.W.2d 591
(1937) ; Loughery v. Bright, 267 Mass. 584, 166 N.E. 744 (1929) ;
Williams v. Hund, 302 Mo. 451, 258 S.W. 703 (1924). See also
Gaines v. Dahlin, 228 Ala. 484, 154 So. 101 (1934).
The trust will not fail for want of a trustee: In re McCray's
Estate, 204 Cal. 399, 268 Pac. 647 (1928); Dominy v. Stanley,
162 Ga. 211, 215, 133 S.E. 245, 247 (1926) ; Jeffreys v. International Trust Co., 97 Colo. 188, 48 P.2d 1019 (1935) ; In re
Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 Atl. 150 (1938).
Where a corporation was named that had no power to administer
the trust, see: In re Crawford's Estate, 148 Iowa 60, 126 N.W.
774 (1910). Where a corporation not in existence is named, see:
Darcy v. Kelley, 153 Mass. 433, 26 N.E. 1110 (1891) ; Bruere v.
Cook, 63 N.J. Eq. 624, 52 Atl. 1001 (1902). Where the person
named was deceased, see: In re De Silver's Estate, 211 Pa. 459,
60 Atl. 1048 (1905) ; Babcock v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion
Soc., 92 Conn. 466, 103 Atl. 665 (1918). Where the person named
was an incompetent, see: Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N.E.
293 (1913) ; Guild v. Allen, 28 R.I. 430, 67 AtI. 855 (1907). Where
the person named refused to act, see: Dailey v. New Haven, 60
Conn. 314, 22 Atl. 945 (1891) ; Richards v. Church Home, 213
Mass. 502, 100 N.E. 631 (1913).
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services of some named particular person. 4 But where the
trustee named by the settlor has qualified for the position,
the equity court has confessed to being without power to
appoint a different person, and the person named, and none
other, is entitled to serve.'" And, of course, the trustee,
whether a person named by the settlor or by the court, once
he has undertaken the administration of the trust not only
may not abandon it"0 but, a fortiori, may not of his own
motion turn over the administration to others of his own
selection, no matter what the reason." These principles are

not subject to criticism, since obviously they are designed
to prevent capricious and ill-considered acts which, unless
14. But cf. Gould v. Board of Home Missions, 102 Neb. 526, 167 N.W.
776 (1918), where the court appointed a substitute for a named
foreign corporation that was incompetent to hold under the local
law, but stated that here a "public" trust was involved, and that
the action would not have been taken had the trust been private.
15. Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N.W. 811 (1909); In re
Goulden, 120 Misc. 642, 170 N.Y. Supp. 154 (1918). In a few cases
where it has appeared that the trust is of a size or nature making
it desirable that the trustee named by the settlor be given assistance in the interest of more efficient or sounder operation, the
court has added trustees to those selected by the settlor: In re
Townsend's Estate, 73 Misc. 481, 133 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1911);
Crickard's Ex'or v. Crickard's Legatees, 25 Gratt. 410 (Va.
1874).
16. The rule is admirably stated in Cruger v. Hallida'y, 11 Paige 314,
319 (N.Y. 1844), where the court said:
. . . But it is a settled rule of law that a trustee, after he has
accepted the office, cannot discharge himself from liability by a
subsequent resignation merely. He must either be discharged
from the trust by virtue of a special provision in the deed, or
will, which creates the trust, or by an order or decree of the
court of chancery, or with the general consent of all persons
interested in the execution of the trust."
17. Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91 (1927) ; Spengler v.
Kuhn, 212 Ill. 186, 72 N.E. 214 (1904); Smith v. Central Trust
Co., 12 App. Div. 278, 42 N.Y. Supp. 740 (1896), aff'd, 154 N.Y.
333, 48 N.E. 553 (1897) ; Gaines v. Dahlin, 228 Ala. 484, 154 So.
101 (1934) ; Forsyth v. Woods, 11 Wall. 484, 20 L.Ed. 207 (U.S.
1870). The rule applies even though the transfer is to a co-trustee,
McMurtrie v. Pennsylvania Co., 9 Phila. 529 (Pa. 1872), or to
the firm of the fiduciary. Forsyth v. Woods, supra. But cf. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bk. v. King, 184 Ga. 238, 190 S.E. 857
(1937), where the court approved a transfer from one corporate
trustee to another in connection with a consolidation. See note
90 infra.
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supervised by the court, might result in harm to the trust
estate and in a failure to carry out the purposes of the
settlor. Further, the cases involved must be distinguished
from the problem of delegation here under consideration
not only in the scope of the duties assigned (there embracing the entire administration of the trust) but in the fact
that no question of special ability in the purported delegatee,
nor lack of it in the trustee, is evident. We must conclude,
however, that. while the conception that the settlor is entitled to the services of a named person does not prevent
others being appointed, either initially or as substitutes,
definite restrictions are imposed on subsequent changes
without judicial supervision or other authority. Changes,
even as basic as obtaining a new trustee, may be made freely, subject only to this one restriction, and it would seem,
therefore, that the conception that the personal services
of the trustee are required because the settlor asked for the
services of that individual is more a matter of words than
realityl-at least insofar as actually obtaining those services is concerned.
I. DELEGATION OF "MINISTERIAL"
TO "DISCRETIONARY"

AS OPPOSED

ACTS

All authorities seem to agree that a fiduciary is under no
personal liability where the acts he delegates to a carefully
chosen agent" are of a purely ministerial nature. These
18.

Perhaps the "rule" should be phrased differently. If we said that
the trustee must act personally not because the settlor desired
the personal services cf this trustee, but the personal services of
whoever served as trustee, we might express more accurately the
wishes of the settlor.
It is submitted that the settlor simply doesn't care (except in
the cases of duties of a very personal nature referred to in note
11 supra, and in the related text) who actually serves if he can
be reasonably sure of honest and sincere, as well as effective, administration. He names a trustee merely to show a preference,
but any adequate substitute would satisfy him. This, on the results of the authorities, is really the law, no matter what the
courts say that may seem to be to the contrary.
19. The word is not used in its technical sense; the "agent" is often
an independent contractor on the one hand, or a mere servant on
the other.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

I Vol. I

situations, however, seem to depend on convenience and
general practice-either from necessity or conformably to
the common usage of mankind 2°-rather than on the superior qualifications or ability of the person delegated to
do the acts as compared with those of the fiduciary, even
though the delegatee may in fact have more expert capacity.
Thus, it is permissible for a fiduciary, required to sell or
purchase a security, to do so by employing the services of a
stock broker,' or, in the case of a transaction in real estate,
to retain a real estate agent,22 and to utilize delegatees in
many other ways, :' so long as the fiduciary retains to himself
the final decision as to the price and other material terms of
the transaction. Thus, in Ball v. Consolidated Realty Co.,2 '
the trustees employed an agent to procure a purchaser for
land owned by the trust, and having decided on the sale to
the buyer thus procured and on the terms, empowered the
agent to execute the actual conveyances. The court observed
that no powers had been delegated except those of a purely
ministerial nature, and continued:
"... It is not charged, nor is it made to appear, that the trustee surrendered or delegated any right of supervision.or control

over the sale and conveyance of the land or over the terms and
conditidns in the deeds made to purchasers, but in effect merely
constituted them agents to perform ministerial duties in connection with selling and conveying the property. It is not shown that
the trustees failed to act with reasonable prudence and diligence
in the selection of their agent or that they did not properly supervise and control its acts." 25
20. 2SCOTT, TRUSTS § 171 (1939).
21. Speight v. Gannt, 9 App. Cas. 1, 29 (1883), where the court said
" . . . nevertheless he (the trustee) may in the administration of
the trust fund avail himself of the agency of third parties, such
as bankers, brokers, and others, if he does so from a moral necessity or in the regular course of business."
22. Ball v. Consolidated Realty Co., 246 Ky. 458, 55 S.W. 2d 60
(1932).
23. Gates v. Dudgeon, 173 N.Y. 426, 66 N.E. 116 (1903) (agent to influence possible buyer to accept trustee's terms) ; In re Pattison's
Will, 190 Wis. 289, 207 N.W. 292 (1926) (disbursement of certain
funds according to pre-determined conditions) ; In re Whitney's
Estate, 78 Cal. App. 638, 248 Pac. 754 (1926) (collection of rents).
24. 246 Ky. 458, 55 S.W.2d 60 (1932).
25. 55 S.W. 2d at 61; note 24 supra.
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The principle established by the decisions in this extensive
group of cases seems basic and entirely in accord with the
realities of the situation. A fiduciary desiring to sell securities must utilize, almost of necessity, the services of a stock
broker who is familiar with the mechanics of the sale, as
well as with the markets for the security, and, if it is a listed
security, the rules of the exchange generally will require
that the broker be a member of the exchange. And a person desiring to -sell real estate will achieve better results
if he utilizes the services of a realtor to locate a purchaser.
It must be noted, however, that the legal justification for
so doing is not that the broker is better able to do the job
than the fiduciary, although that factor is usually present.
Even if the fiduciary is himself a broker or realtor, prudence
would dictate that an outsider be employed, since the strict
rules relating to dealings by a trustee with the trust property
in his personal capacity would create a definite risk of possible challenge of the transaction at some future time and
the imposition on him of the potentially difficult burden of
affirmatively establishing that the transaction was entirely
fair and above-board..2 ' The true basis for the rule is that
prudent business men, in the ordinary course of conducting
their own affairs, would employ a broker or agent in this
type of transaction, 27 and indeed will ordinarily procure better results by so doing.
By the same token, a trustee may deposit trust funds in a
bank, 8 may appoint a bank as custodian of the securities
26. "A trustee will not be permitted to manage the affairs of his
trust, or to deal with the trust property, so as to gain any advantage, directly or indirectly, for himself." Linsley v. Strang,
149 Ia. 690, 693, 126 N.W. 941, 942 (1910). See also Magruder v.
Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 35 S.Ct. 77, 59 L.Ed. 151 (1914) ; Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) ; Mangels
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 290, 173 Atl. 191 (1934);
Frazier v. Jeakins, 64 Kan. 615, 68 Pac. 24 (1902). See also
Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REv. 521, 539
(1936).
27. Ball v. Consolidated Realty Co., supra note 24; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 171 (1939).
28.

Norwood v. Harness, 98 Ind. 134 (1884); Jacobus v. Jacobus, 37
N.J. Eq. 17 (1883).
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owned by the trust,29 and may designate an agent to take
possession of the estate on behalf of the trustee." In all of
these cases, the trustee has retained the ultimate power to
make the decisions as to the handling and final disposition of the trust property. He has, in other words, retained
to himself complete control of the res and has delegated to
others only the mundane duties of a ministerial nature involving little or no discretion and which are basically incidental to the administration of the trust estate. And yet if
a broker, exercising his special knowledge of the securities
markets can urge upon a trustee the sale of a given security
at a given time and price, it is difficult to understand why, if
the sale proves inopportune, the trustee should be held responsible if he delegates to the broker (always assuming he
was carefully selected) the final decisions, and, on the other
hand, saved harmless if, after receipt of the advice, he
reaches the same conclusions. In situations where the fiduciary has delegated more than merely so-called ministerial
acts, and has permitted an agent to exercise some basic control dependent upon judgment and discretion, the courts
have imposed liability for unfortunate results, irrespective
of the motives and intent underlying the action.3' Thus the
fiduciary has been held responsible when he has delegated
the power to lease,3" the decision as to the exchange of
29.

Smith v. Central Trust Co., 12 App. Div. 278, 42 N.Y. Supp. 740
(1896), aff'd, 154 N.Y. 333, 48 N.E. 553 (1897). In this case the
custodianship agreement made by a deceased trustee was not
even questioned-the case turned solely on the point that the
custodian now acted for the new trustee. Had the power of the
original trustee to enter into such an agreement been absent, the
possession of the custodian would have been invalid from inception.
30. Belding v. Archer, 131 N.C. 287, 42 S.E. 800 (1902).
31. North American Trust Co. v. Chappell, 70 Ark. 507, 69 S.W. 546
(1902); Polliham v. Reveley, 181 Mo. 622, 81 S.W. 182, 185
(1904). In the latter case the court said: " . . . There are times
when a trustee may have to act through agents and attorneys,
and if he determines in his own mind how to exercise the discretion vested in him he may appoint an agent or attorney to carry
out his determination. . . . But the discretion with which he
is vested cannot be delegated. . . . " See also Coleman v. Connolly, 242 Ill. 574, 90 N.E. 278 (1909).
32. Markel v. Peck, 144 Mo. App. 701, 129 S.W. 243 (1910).
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securities,33 the payment of income,3" and the surrender or
limitation of control of the fund. 5 While some of the cases
in this category may depend on the fact that the delegation
was inconsistent with the purposes of the trust, as where
the possession of the agent was a bar to the possession of
the trustee or of the cestui, it would seem, where there is no
such basic conflict, where the agent has no interest prejudical
to the trust, and where the agent is carefully selected and
competent in his field, that the entire matter could be
turned over, with utter propriety, to him-and in the numerous instances where the fiduciary lacks experience or ability
in a given sphere, such act might well be to the best interest
of the beneficiaries concerned.
II.

ADVICE OF COUNSEL

Let us consider specifically the matter of the utilization
of the services of attorneys. The maze of possible legal pitfalls" that may entrap the fiduciary has long justified his
employment of attorneys. The propriety of such action and
the payment of the lawyer's compensation from the estate
have long been recognized by the courts, at least if the employment was reasonably necessary and the amount of the
fee in keeping with the character of the services rendered.
One would expect, therefore, to find that the fiduciary who
so employed an attorney would be protected in relying on
33.

34.
35.
36.
.37.

Cooper v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 38 App. Div. 22, 57 N.Y. Supp. 925
(1899), where a corporation was held liable for having transferred a registered bond for an. agent to whom the authority so
to do had been improperly delegated, the corporation having
notice of the trust.
Smith v. Central Trust Co., note 29 supra.
In re Pinchefski, 179 App. Div. 578, 166 N.Y. Supp. 204 (1917).
Of which the matter of delegation by fiduciaries is by no means
the shallowest nor the least well concealed.
McDonald v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 93 Conn. 140, 105 AtI. 331
(1918); Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N.E. 498 (1911). The principle applies even in cases where a trustee resists a removal
proceeding. Jessup v. Smith, 223 N.Y. 203, 119 N.E. 403 (1918).
It does not apply where the fiduciary was at fault or when the
advice was unnecessary: Holcombe v. Holcombe's Ex'rs, 13 N.J.
Eq. 415 (1861) ; In re Reich's Estate, 230 Pa. 55, 79 Atl. 151
(1911) ; Appeal of Stark, 128 Pa. 545, 18 AtI. 426 (1889).
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the advice so obtained, at least if the attorney was selected
with reasonable care and perhaps other sensible limitations
were imposed. Some authorities so indicate, as, for instance, In re Ball,3" where the court said:
"Action taken upon the advice of counsel, when such advice
has been sought for and obtained in good faith, tends to establish
a defense in certain types of actions ..., and we think should

operate as some protection to trustees, who are generally dependent upon such advice, for a mistake of law, if not for an error
of judgment."3
Careful examination of the authorities demonstrates,
however, that consultation with an] reliance on the advice
of attorneys is by no means as effective a protection as is
generally supposed."
Look, for instance, at McClure '. Middletown Trust
Co.' Here a newly substituted trustee, a corporation, referred to its attorney, a competent lawyer, the matter of its
claim against the sureties of its predecessor, who had misappropriated the trust property, "to handle in any way he
saw fit". The attorney advised the trustee that it was under
no obligation to expend its own funds in making an investigation or in pursuing the litigation, and the matter
was dropped after two of the nine beneficiaries had been
asked to advance the necessary funds and refused. As a result, the sureties of the defaulting trustee were discharged,
although by due diligence, the substituted trustee would
have been able to collect from him.
The court agreed that this particular question was one
38. 55 App. Div. 284, 66 N.Y. Supp. 874 (1900). See also: In re
United Conclave Building & Loan Ass'n., 135 N.J. Eq. 63, 37 A.
2d 197 (1944) ; Austin's Estate, 44 Pa. D. & C. 249 (1942).
39. In re Ball, supra note 38, 66 N.Y. Supp. at 877.
40. In re Stahl's Estate, 113 Ind. App. 29, 44 N.E. 2d 529 (1942);
In re Phillips' Guardianship, 144 Neb. 183, 13 N.W. 2d 99 (1944).
Obviousl'y, a fiduciary may not rely upon attorneys in connection
with anything other than a question of law. In In re Ball, note 38
supra, the fiduciary consulted the lawyers in reference to certain
loans that decedent had made during his lifetime. Qua investment
advisors, attorneys are not specialists.
41. 95 Conn. 148, 110 Atl. 838 (1902).
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which required the services of an attorney," involving a
determination of who were the beneficiaries under a rather
complicated trust, of the liability of the surety, and of the
practical question of how to finance the matter and whether
the results would justify the outlay. "Investigation, decision
and action, it might leave to Judge Pearne," says the Court.
"But when it did leave this matter to him, it became responsible for his reasonable diligence, his decision became
its decision, his acts its acts, and his neglect its neglect." 43
The court then found the attorney had been negligent in
not informing all the beneficiaries and giving them an opportunity to advance the necessary funds, which negligence
was charged to the defendant, because he did not take steps
to find out what the attorney was doing, although it is not
clear whether the court was basing defendant's liability on
his own shortcomings, or for the negligence of his attorney.4" In this case, the court was undoubtedly influenced,
subconsciously at least, by the fact that the trustee was a
"professional", and consequently should have been aware,
from its own past experience in the business of acting as
trustee, of the need to make a demand on all the cestuis 5which leads to the interesting speculation as to the possible
outcome had the trustee been an ordinary person unfamiliar
with such matters and, therefore, not to be expected to
know, from experience or otherwise, what action must be
taken. No case squarely on this point has been discovered,"
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.

The court cited Green v. Gaskill, 175 Mass. 265, 56 N.E. 560
(1900).
McClure v. Middletown Trust Co., note 41 supra, 110 Atl, at 841.
The opinion is nebulous on whether the defendant was held liable
for its own lack of diligence in failing "to know what the attorney
was doing," or whether it was charged with responsibility for
the negligence of its attorney on the basis of respondeat superior.
The true agent or servant of a trustee can bind his master on
ordinary agency principles: 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS, § 225 (1939). But
an attorney is ordinarily an independent contractor for the acts
of whom the "master" is not liable.
Again the facts are not clear. In one place, 110 Atl. at 839, it
seems that the trustee himself made the demands on the two
cestuis; in another, 110 Atl. at 841, it appears that the demands
were made by the attorney.
In In re Demmerle's Exr., 130 Misc. 684, 225 N.Y. Supp. 190
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although in Miller v. Proctor,7 executors were protected
who followed an attorney's advice that a certain investment was authorized when, after it was made, it turned
out to have been legally defective. No claim was made,
however, that the attorney, though in error, had been negligent, and the case is distinguishable from the McClure case
on this important ground, although it remains helpful on
the point that a fiduciary is not always a guarantor of results48 when his delegatee makes an incorrect decision.
No argument is or should be made on behalf of a fiduciary who seeks protection because he took advice of counsel on matters not essentially legal in their nature, as, for
instance, where a trustee acts upon an attorney's advice in
connection with the exercise of certain stock subscription
rights received by the trust estate. 9 Here the fiduciary must
be deemed wanting in proper performance of his duties
since it is obvious the proper person to consult on such
questions is not a lawyer but rather a banker, stock broker,
(1927), counsel advised trustees that certain proposed litigation
would be profitless, although whether because of legal deficiency
in the claim, or because of the financial status of the defendant
is not clear. The fiduciaries were protected in relying on this
advice, but there is no indication whether or not they were professionals or otherwise experienced. See also, Neff's Appeal, 57
Pa. 91 (1868). But see: In re Hosford, 27 App. Div. 427, 50 N.Y.
Supp. 550 (1898), where the court felt that with proper diligence
a certain note could have been collected, and refused to absolve
an executor who had been advised by counsel not to bring suit on
the note.
47. 20 Ohio St. 442 (1870).
48. The idea of a fiduciary being a "guarantor" of results when
there has been improper delegation is frequently put forward by
the courts. See note 76 infra.
49. In re Belcher's Estate, 129 Misc. 218, 221 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1927).
See also: In re Westerfield, 32 App. Div. 324, 53 N.Y. Supp. 25
(1898). Here the attorney selected had originated a course of
questionable business soundness, and advised that payments made
in connection therewith could be properly made. Admitting that
the payments might be legal, the court said: "It still remains
that the questions presented were to be solved by business judgment." In re Westerfield, supra, 53 N.Y. Supp. at 39. In Hanscom
v. Marston, 82 Me. 288, 19 Atl. 460 (1890), the attorney advised
the sale of government bonds and the purchase of personal notes
secured by second mortgage. Liability was imposed.
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investment adviser, or other person familiar with matters
of this kind.
But where the fiduciary, admittedly dependent on the advice of counsel in a given case,5" carefully selects a reputable
attorney in an honest effort to procure good advice and
strictly meet all legal requirements of his position, and
follows that advice on legal questions, he should be protected. In the absence of unusual circumstances, such as
special knowledge and experience of the fiduciary himself
in similar matters, negligence of the attorney or even a
palpable blunder on his part should not impose personal
liability on the fiduciary who was diligently seeking to provide sound administration for the trust estate. This does
not absolve the wrong-doing attorney, who is, of course,
liable to the fiduciary for the injury done the trust property,5' but merely renders harmless the trustee for the
wrong of a delegatee who is acting in a specialized field
where the fiduciary has no knowledge and who himself is
guilty of no wrongful act.
Decisions penalizing a fiduciary under these circumstances
tend to defeat their own purpose, since the threat of loss to
his personal estate makes an able and financially responsible
person reluctant to assume the risks (assuming he is aware
of them) as well as the burdens of administration. Greater
liberality will add and not detract from the result desired:
careful and meticulous administration of fiduciary estates
by competent persons.
III.

SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF INVESTMENTS

Next in importance to a trustee taking possession and
assuming control of the trust estate,' is the duty of the
50. See note 38 supra, and related text.
51.
52.

This is elementary learning. See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 280,
393 (1935).
Nagle v. Conard, 79 N.J. Eq. 124, 81 Atl. 841 (1911), aff'd, 80
N.J. Eq. 252, 87 AtI. 1119 (1912) ; Connolly v. Leonard, 114 Me.
29, 95 Atl. 269 (1915) ; Waterman v. Alden, 144 Ill. 90, 32 N.E.
972 (1893).
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the property-according to the terms of

the trust instrument if any are expressed, but even if the
instrument is silent, since the power as well as the duty to
invest will be implied by the court.54 As a necessary incident
to the power to invest, and in the absence of expressed directions to the contrary, the courts in most cases will imply
a power to change investments, and indeed have indicated
that this is not only a power but a duty in the proper administration of the fund.5
The courts have uniformly applied to the activities of
the trustee in making investments the standard of the reasonably prudent man administering his own affairs, with
the same objectives,"6 plus, of course, the highest degree of
good faith, 7 and the mere presence of good intent will not
afford him a defense if his conduct has not met those high

standards of care,"8 although the motives of the trustee may
well be a factor in determining the penalty that will be imposed for the negligent or merely unfortunate result.,"
53. Or otherwise to make the trust productive, as, of instance, in
permitting the cestui to enjoy the property, if that is the purpose.
We are concerned only with investment in the ordinary sense of
the word.
54. Appeal of Grothe, 135 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 1058 (1890).
55. Spencer v. Weber, 163 N.Y. 493, 57 N.E. 753 (1900) ; Citizens'
Nat. Bank v. Jefferson, 88 Ky. 651, 11 S.W. 767 (1889). See
MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 203, § 34 (1932), granting the power to
change investments in the absence of contrary provisions in the
trust instrument.
56. Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 261, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913),
where the court said: " .... trustees are bound in the management of all the matters of the trust, to act in good faith and
employ such vigilance, sagacity, diligence, and prudence as in
general prudent men of discretion and intelligence in like matters
employ in their own affairs." See also: Neff's Appeal, 57 Pa. 91,
96 (1868). And see note I supra.
57. St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 88 N.W. 256 (1901).
58. In In re Hurlbut's Ex'r., 210 App. Div. 456, 206 N.Y. Supp. 448
(1924), the court recognized that while the reliance by an executor, inexperienced in investments, on the advice of a reputable
banking institution would absolve him from lack of good faith,
it did no more than that, since the investment, however honestly
made, was deemed to have been imprudent.
59. Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683 (1858) ; Diffenderffer v. Winder, 3 Gill
& J. 311 (Md. 1831). Compare: Newman v. Shreve, 229 Pa. 200,
78 Atl. 79 (1910), where the ill health of the trustee, while not
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A number of principles relating to the investment of the
trust property have been developed, all tending to produce
common sense dealing with the trust estate, although many
of them would be improved by liberalization. No one can
object to the requirement that the estate be productively
employed within a reasonable time," taking into consideration such pertinent factors as the size of the fund, the state
of the investment market, and many others, or that the investments made must be appropriate for the purposes of the
trust and must give effect to the interests of all concerned,
including any remaindermen, and should emphasize security
of principal, reasonable income and ready marketability,'
pro'.ably in the order named. Nor can fault be found with
the principle that the trust estate should be kept segregated
from the funds of the trustee 112 and probably from the
property of other trusts, " although in a New York case
the court approved of the co-mingling of the funds of a
number of trusts in a single investment.' In respect of the

60.

61.
62.

63.

an excuse for improper management of the trust estate, was considered by the court in determining the extent of his liability.
What is a reasonable time is, of course, a question of fact to be
determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. It is
interesting that two months has been held proper, Witmer's Appeal, 87 Pa. 120 (1878), but that over two years was unreasonable. Cavender v. Cavender, 8 Fed. 641 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1881).
King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869); Tarbox v. Tarbox, 111 Me.
374, 89 Atl. 194 (1914) ; Pray's Appeals, 34 Pa. 100 (1859).
McCullough's Ex'rs v. McCullough, 44 N.J. Eq. 313, 14 Atl. 642
(1883); Hawes v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 54 Ga. App. 776, 189
S.E. 59 (1936).
Moore v. McKenzie, 112 Me. 356, 92 Atl. 296 (1914) ; Jones v.
Harsha, 233 Mich. 499, 206 N.W. 979 (1926) ; First Nat. Bank v.
Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 242, 170 Atl. 209
(1934) ; In re Harbeck's Estate, 142 Misc. 57, 254 N.Y. Supp.

312 (1931) ; 3 BOGERT,
64.

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§ 596 (1946). Contra,

if the settlor has so authorized.
In re Union Trust Co., 219 N.Y. 514, 114 N.E. 1057 (1916). Cf.:
Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Society,
293 Mass. 480, 200 N.E. 541 (1936) (purchase of "participating
interests") ; Appeal of Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh,
324 Pa. 161, 188 Atl. 200 (1936) (mortgage pool) ; Brooklyn
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 865 (2d Cir. 1936) ("common
trust funds"). For forms for common investment funds operated

by consent of the settlors, see 6
§ 1123 (1935).

BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

Generally, statutes permit trust company trus-
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rate of return that the trustee should procure, there seems
again no fixed standard, and each case must depend on the
existing circumstances, with great emphasis being placed
upon the economic situation as well as the requirements for
the safety of the fund and the general purposes of the trust.
Under today's conditions, the phrase "safety and six per
cent" is only a slogan of the past, and so long as government bonds produce two and one-half per cent or less, a
trustee is hard put to procure much more than that without
at least some sacrifice of the security of principal that
should, probably, be his first consideration. 5
The propriety of a given investment, and the results
hoped to be obtained, raise a set of vexatious questions to
plague the conscientious trustee. It must be borne in mind
that, as a practical matter, a given investment and the
wisdom of making it are seldom questioned if the result is
satisfactory. It is the cestui whose trust estate has depreciated and whose income has declined who will be prone
to challenge the authority for a given investment, no matter how seemingly attractive it may have been when made.
The trustee is thus faced at all times with the possibility
that an after-the-event examination of his action in making
an investment"6 will result in its being deemed improper and
the trustee held personally responsible for the unsatisfactory outcome."r Even in those situations where the trustee
has been given complete discretion by the settlor in the mattees thus to co-mingle trust investments. See N. Y. BANKING
LAW, §§ 14 (1), 100-c. See further: Scott, The Law of Trusts,
1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 157, 182 (1945).
65. For cases on the rate of return, see: Graver's Appeal, 50 Pa. 189
(1865) (41/2% satisfactory); and In re Whitecar's Estate, 147
Pa. 368, 23 Atl. 575 (1892) (3%-4% too low).
66. True, the courts say that the propriety of a given investment will
be examined as of the time it was made. Taft v. Smith, 186 Mass.
31, 70 N.E. 1031 (1904). Nevertheless, after the outcome is known
it is not difficult to conclude that an investment which has turned
out badly never should have been made.
67. The trustee, of course, is not personally liable for depreciation
of an investment that was proper when made. In re Goudley's
Estate, 201 Pa. 491, 51 Atl. 315 (1902) ; In re Menzie's Estate,
54 Misc. 188, 105 N.Y. Supp. 925 (1907).
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ter of the selection of investments, he must use prudence
in the exercise of that discretion and select investments accordingly. In In re Hall,8 the Court considered an investment by the trustees in the stock of a small manufacturing
company and disapproved of it saying:
". .. If the trustees had invested in the stock of a railroad,
manufacturing, banking, or even business corporation, which,
by its successful conduct for a long period of time, had achieved
a standing in commercial circles, and acquired the confidence
of investors, their conduct would have been justified, although
the investment proved unfortunate. But the distinction between
such an investment and the one before us is very marked. Surely,
there is a mean between a government bond and the stock of an
Alaska gold mine, and the fact that a trustee is not limited to
the one does not authorize him to invest in the other.""0

The investment of the trust funds is regarded by the
courts as one of the fundamental duties of the trustees 0
and, because it is a duty of a discretionary nature, it is a
duty that cannot be delegated to another. The fiduciary
must himself attend to this function in the administration
of the fund and may not shift the burden to others without
retaining the responsibility."' There appears to be no important authority contrary to this principle."
68.
69,
70.
71.

164 N.Y. 196, 58 N.E. 11 (1900).
58 N.E. at 11; note 68 supra.
See note 53 supra, and the related text.
Note 31 supra, and the related text. See also, City of Boston v.
Curley, 276 Mass. 549, 177 N.E. 557 (1931) ; In re Hurlbut's
Ex'r., 210 App. Div. 456, 206 N.Y. Supp. 448 (1924). Cf. Anderson v. Roberts, 147 Mo. 486, 48 S.W. 847 (1898).
72. Most of the cases seemingly contrary are readily distinguishable.
In In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931), the
trustee failed to sell certain securities for a trust in spite of the
fact that it had issued to the public a booklet recommending the
sale. Although the case speaks of the fact that well known persons in the business were consulted who advised not to sell, the
holding for the trustee really turns on consent or laches on the
part of the cestuis, who held the same security for their own
accounts and refrained from selling. See also Miller v. Proctor,
20 Ohio St. 442 (1870), where an investment made by a fiduciary
later was found to be legally deficient, but protection was granted
because attorneys had been consulted on the purely legal point
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In considering the basic soundness of the rule requiring
the fiduciary personally to decide upon all investments, one
should note that one of the truths which have become evident during the last twenty years is that the handling of investments, while by no means an exact science, is not a field
for amateurs. It is a task for the specialist 3 and definitely
not for the ordinary man-in-the-street, the usual business
man, nor the lawyer, none of whom are qualified for this
activity without substantial outside help and assistance, and
a great deal of careful study of statistics. Indeed, even those
who are admittedly experts in the field of investment have
proved too often that they are by no means infallible by
the results obtained in the security price fluctuations since
1922, and yet the courts have been prompt in holding the
fiduciary who delegates this work to experts personally responsible for bad results, even in the absence of negligence,
while the same person who does his careful and level best,
and has met the required standard" even without seeking
advice, will be held harmless, no matter how bad the results. The line of demarcation seems to be whether the
fiduciary, even though he has taken advice, has reached an
independent judgment, or whether he has blindly followed
the advice so obtained. In the one case the consultation may
have been normal prudence; in the other it is improper
delegation of the administrative power, if the final decision
was made by the adviser rather than the fiduciary, even
admitting the complete ignorance of the fiduciary in the
matters concerned.
Consider, for instance, the plight of the fiduciary in In
re Hurlbut's Ex'r.,"5 where an executor, charged with the
involved and no question arose as to any negligence in connection
with the advice they gave. Sed quaere: had the attorneys been
negligent? See McClure v. Middletown Trust Co., supra note 41,
and the related text.
73. Investment advising is recognized at least as a quasi profession,
the activities of which are affected by public interest great enough
to warrant federal regulation. See the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 54 STAT. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1946).
74. See note 56 supra, and the related text.
75. 210 App. Div. 456, 206 N.Y. Supp. 448 (1924), supra, note 58.
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duty of investing the estate and admittedly without experience in that field, took the advice of the Equitable Trust
Company, at that time one of the leading banking institutions in New York City. The Trust Company recommended
the purchase of certain bonds of which it was the underwriter. It did not appear that the executor knew of the
Trust Company's interest in the issue or, if he did, that he
was aware of the significance of the position of an underwriter of an issue of bonds, or that such position necessarily
presupposed an interest in the sale. The court described the
bonds as "new, untried and unseasoned." The executor,
under the circumstances, was held to have made an imprudent investment and was surcharged for the resulting loss.
Here is a situation where it would seem the fiduciary
took all reasonable steps to procure competent advice as
to the investment of the estate. He obtained and followed
the recommendation of one of the most prominent banking
institutions in New York. The results were bad, and, in
spite of the care exercised by this babe in the financial woods,
he had become what amounts to a "guarantor""6 of those
results.
It should be noted, parenthetically, that the opinion gave
no consideration to the possibilities of recovery by the estate
or others interested, against the advising bank, based upon
its recommendation of an issue of which it was the under76. See, in this connection, the following cases, where only the word
"guarantor" can adequately describe the liability of the fiduciary
who improperly relied upon, or delegated discretion to, others:
In re Belcher's Estate, 129 Misc. 218, 221 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1927) ;
McCollister v. Bishop, 78 Minn. 228, 80 N.W. 1118 (1899). See
also Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91, 95

(1927),

where the court said: "The authorities seem to be practically
harmonious in holding that when a trustee unlawfully delegates
and surrenders his discretionary powers to some one else, with
reference to the control and management of the trust property,
he becomes a quarantor and is responsible for any loss that may
have resulted, whether or not such loss can be shown to be the
result of the delegation of power; the theory being that it is
against public policy for one to delegate powers which have been
intrusted to him alone . . . ....
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writer 7and in the sale of which it had a direct financial interest.

It would seem that the inexperienced trustee who realizes
his inability in the matter of investments and their selection
should be permitted to turn over to competent investment
advisers, chosen with the great care usually required by fiduciaries, 8 all of the problems relating to the selection of such
investments, as well as the time and manner of their making,
and be comphtely protected in so doing. Indeed, a trustee
with this degree of unfamiliarity with securities and their
markets might well be deemed negligent in the performance
of his trust if, aware of his failings, he proceeded to make
investments without the help of able and expert advice.
And yet the decisions in these cases seem to turn on the
slender point whether the trustee has reserved to himself
the power to make the final decision. In other words, if the
trustee has consulted an investment adviser and has gone
through the motions of reaching an independent decision,
even though in fact all he has done is to follow the professional's advice, then he is not liable for the untoward results, assuming that the security was reasonably proper for
the trust to own.7" And yet if the same trustee had turned
over to the same investment adviser the full power to make
the selections and to time the purchases, and the same security were purchased with the same unfortunate results,
then the trustee would have succeeded only in making himself a "guarantor"" ° and responsible for the results, with a
possibility of mitigation of damages if the action were in
good faith.8'
77. The rights of recovery under the then existing (1928) law perhaps was dubious. But, under modern statutes, such as the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1946), the liability of the bank would be clear unless
all material facts, including, of course, the bank's status as underwriter of the issue, were revealed.
78. Greater, perhaps, than the care of the ordinary man, prudently
conducting his own affairs, such as applied to the ordinary activities of the fiduciary. See note 56 supra.
79. See note 68 supra, and the related text.
80. See note 76 supra.
81. See note 59 supra.
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This principle at one time carried so far as actually to
cause serious doubt as to the propriety of a fiduciary authorized to invest in stocks, purchasing the stock of an "investment trust" on the ground that so to do would "delegate"
to the management of the company the' power to handle
the investments of the trust estate-a doubt that is by no
means allayed by recent authority. 2 While there is ample
reason to argue that such investment is improper upon the
ground that the handling of investments by an investing
company is a service to its stockholders, and therefore not
a business conducted by the company in which its stockholders participate as do stockholders in any other business,
it would seem that such a result seizes upon the technicalities of the law applicable to trustees such as have been discussed in this paper. The realistic viewpoint is that investment companies, or trusts, are as much engaged in the conduct of a business as a bank, insurance company or other
financial institution where the objective is enhancement of
the value of capital and the realization of earnings. To
speak of "delegation" in this situation is to be antiquated,
pedagogic, and "to spin out webs of theory on relatively
obscure point"." An investment company of good reputation, sound management, with a conservative capitalization
and a well diversified portfolio would seem an ideal investment for trustees or other fiduciaries empowered to invest
in common stocks, for that portion of the estate which is
to be devoted to common stock investment. It is particularly
so for the fiduciary who, because of lack of experience, or
other circumstances, feels that this method of investing
would be the answer to many of his problems.8"
82.

In Marshall v. Frazier, 159 Ore. 491, 80 P.2d 42, rehearing
denied, 159 Ore. 491, 81 P.2d 132 (1938), the investment was
held improper. See Lukens, Investment Trusts as Trust Investments, 79 U. OF PA. L. Rgv. 266 (1931). But in In re Estate of
William D. Rees, No. 56,362, Ohio Probate Ct., Cuyahoga C'ty
(1947), such purpose was held proper. See further, 60 HARV. L.
REv. 1360 (1947).

83. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938).
84. Shattuck, Legal Propriety of Investment by American Fiduciaries
in the Shares of Boston-type Open End Investment Trusts, 25
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EMERGENCY DELEGATION

In spite of diligent search, no case has been uncovered
where special circumstances of any sort existed which permitted the fiduciary to delegate to others the authority to
make final decisions in these matters, or to take any. step
which prevents him from exercising the complete power of
control over the trust and its administration. Yet common
sense tells us that circumstances must often exist which
would not only warrant but actually require the delegation
of authority to make decisions in connection with the trust
estate.
Ill health of the trustee, apparently, only serves to mitigate damages"5 where the trustee continued the administration in a negligent manner. Had he sought greater efficiency
by turning the administration of the estate over to a carefully selected agent with full responsibility for all details,
he would, it seems, have been denied even the boon of mitigation.
A basic problem of this same nature involves the temporary or extended absence of the trustee under circumstances where proper administration of the trust becomes
impractical, if not impossible. Trustees do, for instance, go
to war-as thousands of them did-which creates a problem of prime importance. What can he do? If he requests
removal and the appointment of a substitute (assuming the
exigencies of his service give him time to take these steps)
he loses for all time the appointment; if he delegates to an
agent, he commits a breach of trust and is a guarantor of
results; if he does nothing and hopes for the best, he may
be removed for cause and held personally responsible for
all losses occasioned by his failure to perform his duties.
During both World Wars, England gave simple and
adequate relief by statutory enactments permitting a trustee, by ordinary power of attorney, to delegate the execution
B.U.L. REV. 1 (1945). But see 60 HARV. L. REV. 1361 (1947). See
generally STEVENSON, SHARES IN MUTUAL INVESTMENT FUNDS
(1946), particularly the chapter headed "Legal Propriety." And
see the review of this book in 60 HARV. L. REV. 320 (1946).
85. Newman v. Shreve, 229 Pa. 200, 78 Atl. 79 (1910).
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of the trust for the period of his war service." Apparently,
our involvement in World War I was too short for comparable action in the United States in 1917, but during

World War II approximately a third of the states enacted
statutes which provided for substituted fiduciaries where
the encumbent was engaged in war service,87 most of which,
unfortunately, provide for application to the court rather
than the simple and forthright temporary power of attorney authorized for the English trustee. In the absence of
statute (seldom a satisfactory solution and often, as in
two-thirds of our states, not available), the absentee fiduciary is in a difficult position, since it is readily seen that a
trustee who does not make some reasonable and common
sense arrangement for the handling of the estate during
an inability to perform, whether caused by absence, illness
or whatever, including, if that seems reasonably necessary
or desirable, delegation of the discretionary power that he
could not exercise adequately himself, has failed in the
proper administration of his trust.8 As a necessary corollary, a fiduciary who takes such obviously sensible precautions should be afforded personal protection in the event of
any unfortunate consequences.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The above principles, it is submitted, should apply to any
activity where, because of specialized training (such as of
86. Execution of Trusts (War Facilities) Act, 1914, 5 and 6 Geo. V.
c. 13; Execution of Trusts (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939 2
and 3 Geo. VI. c. 114.
87. See, for instance, GA.

CODE ANN.

§§ 113-2501 to 113-2506 (Supp.

1947). N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW, § 20a; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW,
§ 111-a; and many others. Consult Scott, The Law of Trusts,
1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 157, n. 3 (1945), for a complete list
of such statutes. See Stone, Substitute Fiduciariesfor Fiduciaries
in War Service, 77 TRUSTS & ESTATES 269 (1943).
88. Non-residence or removal from the jurisdiction has been deemed
a ground for discretionary action of the court for the removal of
a trustee. Dorsey v. Thompson, 37 Md. 25 (1872) ; Letcher's Trustee v. German Nat. Bank, 134 Ky. 24, 119 S.W. 236 (1909);
Barkley Cemetery Ass'n v. McCune, 119 Mo. App. 349, 95 S.W.
295 (1906). But see In re Amsinck's Estate, 103 Misc. 124, 169
N.Y. Supp. 336 (1918), where the trustee was an alien and had
been interned. Nevertheless, he was not removed!
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lawyers, accountants, engineers, investment advisers, etc.)
or because of special circumstances (such as lack of experience of the fiduciary, illness, absence, etc.) the fiduciary
reasonably believes that the best interests of the estate require the services of someone other than himself, whether
it be for a special task, or for the general administration of
the estate for an emergency period, and he should be able
to appoint such an agent without a court application. Liberalized rules along these lines would promote better administration of the estate, would tend to induce men of
higher caliber and with a greater sense of responsibility to
serve as fiduciaries, and would be to the ultimate advantage
of the beneficiaries. Necessarily, reasonable safeguards
should be erected to prevent the abuse of these more realistic practices. Thus, the services of the agent should not be
a matter of caprice on the part of the fiduciary-they
should be procurable only where the fiduciary 'bona fide, as
well as reasonably, believes there is something to be gained
by their utilization. The fiduciary should never divest himself of the general power of supervision or of the right at
any time to discharge the agent and to do the work himself or through another agent, and the discharge should ble
without possible claim against the estate for wrongful discharge of the agent. The agent selected should have the
same degree of responsibility to the estate and to the beneficiaries as is now required of the trustee: careful work,
the greatest degree of good faith, and complete devotion
to the interests of the trust and those interested in its
proper conduct. By the same token, the agent should have
no claim against or right to the trust property except subordinated to those of the cestuis-in fact, the agent so selected should be placed under essentially the same standards
in respect of his activities that 'now apply to the activities
of the trustee. He should be permitted to undertake the
work only when he has as complete knowledge of the existence of the trust and its terms and conditions as the trustee
himself, and his acceptance of the work under those conditions should be a necessary element in his employment. All
of these things could be accomplished by provisions in the
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contract by which the agent is appointed and employed.
At first blush, it may appear that a serious and basic
change in the law applicable to the activities of a trustee
or other fiduciary in the conduct of his duties is advocated.
But this is not entirely so. The realities of present day conditions already have resulted in the earlier rules, founded
on principles developed in the adolescence of equity, no
longer being appropriate for common situations. This
would not be the first instance where the courts have brought
the old rules out of the "horse and buggy days" and have
molded them to fit modern requirements. Indeed, one does
not have to go outside of the trust field to find at least one
instance of recognition that modern institutions require
re-examination of the old principles. Corporations were not
known at the time of the origination of many of the doctrines that have been discussed in this paper. And yet, corporate trustees and executors are now by no means exceptional. Corporations, of necessity, must act through agents.
Many agents and employees of a corporate fiduciary must
take part in the administration of the estate, not only for
ministerial purposes, but for the exercise of discretionary
authority as well. And since those employees and officers
who make the discretionary decisions are subject to change
at the will of the employer corporation, it often happens
that the discretion is exercised by different individuals on
successive occasions. The courts have never had difficulty
in permitting such things, in spite of the fact that something
very much like delegation necessarily takes place.8" Under
proper conditions, a corporation resulting from the merger,
consolidation, or other change in business form of a corporate trustee or executor, may become the successor trustee or executor without formality of a court appointment."
89. Of course, the corporation continues liable as fiduciary for the
actions of its agents, but not as "guarantor." Some act of negligence or other default must be present. McClure v. Middletown
Trust Co., supra, note 4. Not so where the individual trustee appoints an independent agent to perform discretionary acts; the

trustee is absolutely liable in many instances, even where there
is no question of negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the
agent. See note 76 supra, and the cases there cited.
90. In re Bergdorf's Will, 206 N.Y. 309, 99 N.E. 714 (1912). Where
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Commendable as may be the theory of the rule against
delegation of basic powers and duties to others, being based
theoretically upon the settlor desiring the personal services
of the named fiduciary and none other, it is not basically
sound to require a method of fiduciary operation and administration that not only falls short of the best results for
the trust estate, but in many cases is actually contrary to
the best judgment of the trustee, and is based upon conceptions of law and equity that have been long out of sympathy
with the dictates of modern commercial life.
The rulings in respect of corporate trustees represent
developments in the law applicable to fiduciaries based upon
a realistic appreciation of the facts. A similar appreciation
of the facts could readily bring about a liberalization of the
rules applicable to the activities of fiduciaries who wisely
decide that, in some things, qui facit per alium procures better results.
national banks consolidate, the new institution succeeds to the
fiduciary status held by the old institution. Mueller v. First Nat.
Bank, 171 Ga. 845, 156 S.E. 662 (1931) ; First Nat. Bank v. Harry
E. Chapman Co., 160 Tenn. 72, 22 S.W. 2d 245 (1929). See also
12 U.S.C. §§ 33, 34, 34a (1946). Sec. 34a provides that when a
state bank or trust company merges with a national bank the
trusteeships of the state institution vest in the national bank.
See Adams v. Atlantic Nat. Bank, 115 Fla. 399, 155 So. 648
(1934); Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, 173 Ga. 332, 160 S.E. 243
(1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684, 52 S. Ct. 201, 76 L. Ed. 578
(1931). But see Ex parte Worcester County Nat. Bank, 279 U.S.
347, 49 S. Ct. 368, 73 L.Ed. 733 (1929), where the court held that
the status would not pass if contrary to local law (see Atlantic
Nat. Bank of Boston, Petitioner, 261 Mass. 217, 158 N.E. 780
(1927)); and Hofheimer v. Seaboard Cit. Nat. Bank, 154 Va.
392, 153 S.E. 656 (1930), aqf'd, 154 Va. 896, 156 S.E. 581 (1931),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 855, 51 S. Ct. 648, 75 L.Ed. 1462 (1931),
holding that where a will named a state bank as executor and
the bank merged with a national bank prior to testator's death,
the national bank did not take the executorship. Cf., In re Stikeman, 48 Misc. 156, 96 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1905), where the testator
named a strictly banking corporation, which, after execution of
the will, merged with a title guarantee and trust company, the
court ruling that the successor corporation was of such a basically
different nature then than originally named that the succession
would not be permitted.

